How Big Things Get Done. 2023 Bent Flybjerg and Dan Gardner New York: Currency

Meticulous planning, as was done with the construction of the Empire State Building, that resulted in a project that came 17 percent under budget and ahead of schedule, caused the authors of How Big Things Get Done to conclude that the secret to success results in "think slow, act fast" (p. xvi). Think slow implies adequate planning and analyzing the benefits of the project. Planning, according to the authors, "explores, imagines, analyzes, tests, and iterates" (p. 46); planning explores questions and an understanding of the goal and the reason for it. With all important challenges addressed, the project team can "act fast". The authors distill these two concepts into the team dynamics of power and psychology. Power, the politics of the group, controls the decision-making process. Psychology gets at the emotional temper of the group, optimism, pessimism, and something in between. Flybjerg and Gardner consider optimism the human default, we defer to the "best case" scenario. They also acknowledge the human preference for action over thought. Looking at project development linearly, the authors supported this progression, "think from right to left," the title of the third chapter. Multiple thinkers have characterized this form of analysis. John B. Robinson, a professor of urban and environmental planning, coined the term, "backcasting", envisioning a future state and explaining the steps to attain it. Jeff Bezos, at Amazon, took a different approach. To initiate a project, employees would write a Press Release and Frequently Asked Questions that they would present to execs, in multiple iterations, refining with each version. However, even this process failed with the introduction of the Fire Phone, because of the insistence of the chief executive officer. One fundamental ingredient to successful project completion, experience, includes not only explicit knowledge, understanding the processes, structure, and details of the task, but also tacit knowledge, the unwritten, intuitive understanding. Because no two projects are exactly the same, testing, simulating, and experimenting allow for the better methods to manifest and move the project forward. Eliminating or minimizing bias also clarified the end goals. Uniqueness bias prevents applying tested actions from facilitating the process. The authors applied the concept of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, "reference class" (p. 105) that derives from your perspective, "inside" or "outside" (p. 106-107). To obtain a realistic cost, the authors recommend that project managers calculate all possible cost, time, benefits and compare your project to the mean of all projects, then decide on cost, time, and resources. The robustness of the data determines the accuracy of the estimate, so collect lots of data. With this approach, you have to factor in the "regression to the tail", the unknown risks. The authors advise to skew the estimate to the fat tail. For extra assurance, add a contingency of 10 to 20 percent. Even with all these safeguards, a "black swan" event might occur, such as the pandemic, rare occurrences that completely alter the context in which your project takes place. By amassing the data, discovering the fat tail, identifying potential black swans, and adding contingencies, can a project team remove their uniqueness bias. A portfolio of projects does not reduce the overall losses. With a portfolio, managers factor in opportunity costs, money spent that could have produced greater returns. After undergoing extensive planning, the authors explain "acting fast" with Chapter 8 entitled, "A single, determined organism" (p. 143), a cohesive, committed team, with each member operating according to her or his strengths. They go through the planning stage, for a construction project, they simulate the project and the assembly--the analysis of the site and the parts for construction, and, third, team optimization and devotion to the project. For the team element, identity with the team and understanding the team purpose and standards underpin team success. The book concludes by describing projects that usually do not go terribly wrong--"solar power, wind power, fossil thermal power (power plants that generate electricity by burning fossil fuels), electricity transmission, and roads" (p. 155). Modularity, having blocks from which to build structures reduces risks. Nuclear power plants do not fit this list, as the author explained with the construction of the Monju nuclear plant in Japan. Why, because the structure does not permit simulation and testing. Secondly, so few have been built and each setting is unique. Additionally, the project only starts to generate revenue after complete commissioning. What makes the projects listed above less risky? They are smaller, modular, with few variables, and often duplicated, and scale-free--expandable without a change of plan. The authors define "'scale-free scalability', meaning you can scale up or down following the same principles independently of where you are scalewise, which is exactly what you want in order to build something huge with ease" (pp. 165-166). Real world examples include projects as diverse as Norway's hydroelectric projects, Elon Musk's factories, Planet's satellites, Madrid's subway, and shipping containers. The authors end the book with the "eleven heuristics for better project leadership" (p. 185). They include: "hire a masterbuilder. . . get your team right. . .ask 'why'. . . build with lego. . .think slow, act fast. . .take the outside view. . . watch your downside. . . say no and walk away. . . make friends and keep them friendly. . . build climate mitigation into your project. . . know that your biggest risk is you" (pp. 185-190).